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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
as trustee of UTAH STATE
RETIREMENT FUND, a common
trust fund,
Case No. 920724CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,

(Priority No. 15)

vs.

PRICEVIEW, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership;
PRICE K.M., a Utah limited
partnership; FRANZ C. STANGL,
III, individually and as
Personal Representatives of
the Estate of ELIZABETH ANN
STANGL; and JOHN DOES 1-20,
Defendants/Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over this case under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUES
The determinative rules and statutes are set forth in the Addendum to the
Brief of the Appellee Utah State Retirement Board, dated June 3, 1991 (hereinafter the
"Fund's 1991 Brief) filed in the prior appeal.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board, as Trustees of the Utah State

Retirement Fund, (the "Fund") commenced this action to enforce its rights under two
promissory notes executed by Priceview Ltd., which were secured by two trust deeds
covering the Creekview Shopping Center located in Carbon County. Defendant F. C.
Stangl ("Stangl")1 and his wife also guaranteed payment of the two notes pursuant to
two Guaranty Agreements. This is an appeal from the lower court's: (1) Judgment (R.
2646) awarding judgment against defendants Priceview, Ltd., Price K. M., and Stangl,
jointly and severally; and (2) Order Denying Recusal entered May 25, 1990, (R. 1673).
B.

Course of Proceedings.
Defendants have filed two appeals from the orders and judgments of the

lower court.2 On its own motion, the Supreme Court entered an Order on September
18, 1991, consolidating both appeals. The first appeal was from the lower court's entry
of summary judgment against Stangl (R. 1347), which was certified as a final judgment
under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (R. 1676). The issues in that appeal
have been fully briefed and are awaiting disposition by this Court.

1

Consistent with the other briefs filed in the two appeals, appellants/defendants
shall be collectively referred to as "Stangl" in this brief. F. C. Stangl is the only real
party in interest among the defendants. Priceview Ltd. and Price K.M. have been
dissolved. Elizabeth Stangl is deceased.
2

Stangl's first appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, filed on June 19, 1990, (R. 1679)
was docketed as Case No. 900302. The second appeal to that Court, filed on July 12,
1991, (R. 2693) was docketed as Case No. 910333.
-2-

Pursuant to court's order and decree of foreclosure (R. 1347), the Sheriff of
Carbon County sold the property that was the subject of the two trust deeds on March
12, 1990, to the Fund for a sum of $3,500,000.00. (Finding of Fact No 1, R. 2640;
see also R. 1454, 1456.)
The case was tried before the lower court sitting without a jury on January
30, 1991. (R. 2455.) On March 1, 1991, the court issued its Memorandum Decision
on Trial Matters (R. 2618). The court subsequently entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 2639) and Judgment (R. 2646), from which Stangl took the
present appeal. Stangl's brief in the second appeal filed on or about October 28, 1992,
(hereinafter "Stangl's 1992 Brief) and the Fund's present brief are intended to address
issues raised at trial.
C.

Disposition at Trial Court.
The lower court awarded a deficiency judgment against Priceview, Ltd., Price

K.M., and Stangl, jointly and severally, on the First Claim for Relief in the principal
amount of $2,481,314.16, with interest, and on the Second Claim for Relief in the
principal amount of $342,265.96, with interest.3 The court further awarded judgment
on the Fifth Claim for Relief in the principal amount of $57,682.78, with interest. The
Court also awarded plaintiff attorneys' fees in the amount of $88,129.60, and costs in
the amount of $572.40. (R. 2646.)

3

The judgment against Stangl on the First and Second Claims for Relief was for the
same amounts as awarded against Stangl pursuant to the court's summary judgment
dated January 31, 1990. (R. 1347.)
-3-

STATEMENT OF FACTS4
Plaintiff Utah State Retirement Board, as trustees of the Utah State
Retirement Fund, (the "Fund") entered into a Limited Partnership Agreement with Price
K.M., a Utah general partnership. The Limited Partnership Agreement created Priceview
Ltd., ("Priceview") as a Utah limited partnership.5 Price KM. was the sole general
partner of Priceview and the Fund was the sole limited partner. F. C. Stangl, III, was
the sole general partner of Price K.M. (Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 5, 6; R. 2640-41.)
In 1983, the Fund loaned $2,350,000.00 to Priceview. Priceview agreed to
repay the loan pursuant to the terms of a Promissory Note. In 1985 the Fund made a
second loan to Priceview for $160,000.00, which Priceview also agreed to repay
according to the terms of a Promissory Note. Both Notes were secured by deeds of
trust covering property located in Carbon County. Each Note was also personally
guaranteed by Stangl and his wife.6
Defendants defaulted on their obligations under the loan documents,
following which the Fund commenced this action. The lower court entered summary
judgment against Stangl based on his and his wife's personal guarantees, but reserved

4

For a more complete statement of facts, the Fund refers this Court to the
Statements of Facts contained in Stangl's and the Fund's respective briefs filed in the
first appeal.
5

A copy of the Limited Partnership is attached to Stangl's 1991 Brief as Exhibit 1.

6

Copies of the pertinent loan documents are attached to Stangl's 1991 Brief (filed
in the first appeal) as Exhibits 2-7. See also R. 699-842.
-4-

for trial the defenses that defendants raised against enforcement of the two Notes.7 (R.
1347.) Following trial of those issues on January 30, 1991, the court held in favor of
the Fund. The court found that the Fund did not interfere with Stangl's management of
the property and that it did not breach its duty of care as a lender. (Findings of Fact
Nos. 7-9; R. 2641 -42.)8
Stangl also contended at trial that the Fund had prevented him from disposing
the property in order to pay off the Notes in full. (Findings of Fact Nos. 7, 9; R. 264142.) The Court found in favor of the Fund on this issue as well, holding that
"Defendants failed to meet their burden of proving that plaintiff breached any duty to
defendants to cooperate with defendants in their efforts to sell the shopping center."
(Finding of Fact No. 9; R. 2642.) The court concluded that the Fund "was under no
legal duty or obligation to give up its individually held assets, namely the neighboring
K-Mart, in order to facilitate defendants' sale of the shopping center." The court found
7

In his 1991 Brief (filed in his first appeal), Stangl describes these defenses:
Beginning in 1985, when Mr. Chipman took over responsibility for
the Fund's involvement in Priceview, Ltd., Mr. Stangl, as general
partner of Priceview, Ltd., began to experience difficulties and
frustration in obtaining the cooperation of the Fund in the
management of the Priceview Property. The difficulty and
frustration primarily involved the lack of timely and responsive
answers from the Fund to Mr. Stangl's requests for approval of
leases, rent adjustments and tenant improvements in accordance
with the First and Second Trust Deed.

(Stangl's 1991 Brief, 14-15.)
8

The Court found specifically that Stangl failed to introduce any evidence that "the
actions of the plaintiff in any way impaired the value of the pledged property,
diminished the income, or prevented the leasing or negotiation for leases on any of the
pledged property." (Finding of Fact No. 8; R. 2641-42.)
-5-

"no duty on the part of plaintiff to cooperate in defendants' efforts to sell the shopping
center." (Conclusion of Law No. 8; R. 2644.)9
Having held against defendants on the defenses they had raised to the
enforceability of the Notes, the court entered Judgment against all defendants, jointly
and severally, for the amounts due on the Notes on the First and Second Claims of the
Fund's Amended Complaint, which was the same amount of the summary judgment
previously awarded to the Fund.10 The court held Price K.M. liable for Priceview's debt
as its general partner, and Stangl liable in his capacity as the general partner of Price
K.M., pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Utah
Code Ann. § 48-2-9 (1989) and the Utah Uniform Partnership Act, Utah Code Ann. §
48-1-12 (1989). (Conclusion of Law No. 6; R. 2644.)
The court also found that, in addition to its liability on the Notes, Priceview
was liable for breach of the Limited Partnership Agreement in the total amount of
$57,682.78. (Finding of Fact No. 3; R. 2640-41; Judgment, «[ 1(c); R. 2648.)11 The

9

Stangl has not appealed from these adverse rulings.

10

The Judgment specifically provides that M[t]he liability of defendants Franz C.
Stangl, III, Priceview Ltd., and Price K.M. for the judgment amounts on the First and
Second Claims for Relief . . . is joint and several with the liability of Franz C. Stangl,
III, under the Partial Summary Judgment and Order and Decree of Foreclosure, filed
January 31, 1990. Satisfaction of one such liability shall constitute satisfaction of the
other." (Judgment, «I 3; R. 2649.)
11

The court found that, under Section 7 of the Limited Partnership Agreement
provided that the Fund was to receive a percentage of the net cash receipts and that
Priceview had failed to pay a total principal amount of $33,926.00 due to the Fund.
(Finding of Fact No. 2; R. 2640; Conclusion of Law No. 2; R. 2643.) Although Stangl
admitted that the payments were due under the Limited Partnership Agreement, he
contended that the money was used for the "mutual benefit" of the partnership. The
(continued...)
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court further awarded the Fund its costs and attorneys' fees. The court held that Price
K.M. was liable for these additional amounts as Priceview's general partner and that
Stangl was liable as Price K.M.'s general partner. (Conclusion of Law No. 6; R. 2644.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The loan documents that Stangl signed are clear and unambiguous. The

lower court properly refused to admit evidence that would vary or contradict the terms
of the documents, under the parol evidence rule. The evidence proffered by Stangl
regarding his intent and his understanding was inadmissible.
At trial, the lower court excluded some of the testimony of Burten Johnson.
Stangl proffered Johnson's testimony that the Fund treated the partnership transaction
as an "equity* on its books. Stangl argues on appeal that Johnson's evidence of the
Fund's post-closing conduct is relevant in determining whether the documents were
ambiguous under the rule of practical construction. Stangl made no such argument
below, and cannot make it on appeal for the first time. Moreover, the objection that
the lower court sustained related only to Johnson's pre-closing conversations with Fred
Fairclough. Stangl never sought admission of Johnson's statement about the Fund's
post-closing treatment of the transaction, but merely proffered that statement. At no
time was the trial court asked to consider that evidence under the doctrine of practical
construction.

n

(...continued)
court held that this fact "would not relieve the partnership from the contractual
obligations as stated in the Limited Partnership Agreement." (Finding of Fact No. 4; R.
at 2641.)
-7-

Even if Johnson's testimony were admitted, it is entirely consistent with the
Limited Partnership Agreement, which provides that the Fund owned an 80 percent
interest in the partnership. The fact that the Fund may have believed it had an "equity"
interest in the partnership is not grounds for invalidating the Notes and Guarantees,
particularly since the Limited Partnership Agreement provides that nothing contained in
that agreement would relieve the partnership and general partner from any liability for
repayment of the loan from the Fund. (Limited Partnership Agreement, § 4.07.)
Further, Stangl has failed to demonstrate why the Notes and Guarantees (the
terms of which are clear) are somehow unenforceable as a result of the Fund's
treatment of the partnership agreement on its books. The documents can be read
consistent with each other and with the Fund's treatment.
2.

The loan documents do not contain a latent ambiguity. Stangl failed to

raise this issue below and cannot do so for the first time on appeal. Even considered on
the merits, Stangl's retrospective opinion that the structure is absurd is not a basis for
invalidating the Notes and Guarantees.
3.

Stangl is estopped from claiming that the loan transactions were ultra

vires and otherwise has no standing to assert that defense. In any event, the
transactions were not ultra vires or were ratified by the Utah Legislature's adoption of
the "prudent investor" standard.
4.

The lower court properly awarded compound interest, since the Notes

entitle the Fund to interest on "all accrued but unpaid interest" at the rate of 18
percent.

-8-

5.

Stangl cannot argue that the second judgment against him is duplicative

of the first, since this issue was never raised below. On the merits, the second
judgment on the First and Second Claims for Relief is identical to the summary
judgment against Stangl, although both judgments are based on different legal theories.
The Fund is only entitled to a single recovery.
The summary judgment against Stangl was not barred by the One Action
Rule. Even if it was barred, that defense is now moot, since the real property has been
foreclosed and sold a public auction.
6.

The lower court properly declined to recuse itself. Judge Bunnell's

membership in the retirement system administered by the Fund (like that of every other
judge and justice in the State) is not a substantial enough interest to require
disqualification. Stangl's affidavit of disqualification was not timely. The lower court's
adverse evidentiary rulings do not show any bias against Stangl.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT
THE DOCUMENTS WERE UNAMBIGUOUS.
Although he concedes that the loan documents "appear to be unambiguous,"
Stangl argues that "the parties consistently treated the transaction as an equity
investment." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 12.) The parties' conduct, Stangl claims, shows
that the parties intended that the Fund make an "equity investment" in the property
rather than a loan to the limited partnership, thus creating an ambiguity in the
documentation. Id. at 5, 12, 18. Stangl asserts that the parol evidence rule does not
-9-

exclude evidence of the conduct of the parties if that conduct creates an ambiguity by
demonstrating that the documents have a different meaning. Id. at 7.
At the trial, Stangl sought to prove that the parties considered the transaction
to be the purchase of an "equity" by the Fund. Stangl attempted to introduce his own
testimony and the testimony of one of the Fund's former employees, Burten "Butch"
Johnson. The trial court excluded the evidence on the Fund's objections based on the
parol evidence rule and relevance. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 60-61, 194.) The court's rulings
were proper and should not be reversed. As argued below, in proffering his own
testimony, Stangl did not give any evidence of conduct of the parties. He testified only
regarding his own understanding of the transaction, which was clearly inadmissible
under the parol evidence rule.
Stangl also sought to introduce the testimony of Burten Johnson that the
Fund treated the Creekview property as an "equity1 on its books. (Tr. [1-30-91], at
200; quoted in Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 16.) As argued below, Stangl proffered that
testimony as part of a lengthy proffer and never actually sought its admission into
evidence under the doctrine of practical construction. The only question to which the
Fund objected related to Johnson's pre-closing conversations regarding the transaction.
Stangl cannot raise the practical construction rule on appeal for the first time.
Moreover, Johnson's statement was hardly evidence of the Fund's conduct that created
an ambiguity. The Fund does not dispute that it owned an 80 percent interest in the
limited partnership, pursuant to Section 4.01 of the Limited Partnership Agreement.
That fact scarcely justifies a finding that the two promissory notes signed by Priceview
and guaranteed by Stangl have no legal effect.
-10-

A.

Stangl's excluded testimony does not contain any admissible
evidence of an ambiguity in the documentation.
Stangl contends that the lower court erred in not considering his own

testimony regarding his "understanding of the partnership/loan transaction with the
Fund." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 12.)12 Despite StangPs analysis of the doctrine of
practical construction (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 8-12), the testimony that he proffered
simply does not constitute evidence of post-closing conduct of the parties. Although
parol evidence is admissible for the purpose of explaining an ambiguity contained in the
writing,13 Stangl did not testify regarding the conduct of the parties after the
transaction closed. He stated only what his understanding was at the time of the
closing.
In his brief, Stangl confused the parol evidence rule with the doctrine of
practical construction. He cites the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Bullfrog Marina,
Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 268, 501 P.2d 266 (Utah 1972), for the rule that a
contract may be considered to be ambiguous "[w]here the parties have demonstrated by
their action and performance that to them the contract meant something quite different,

12

This is not the first time that Stangl has argued that the documents were
ambiguous. In his first brief (filed in the first appeal), Stangl argued that the
documents were ambiguous because the Limited Partnership Agreement appeared to
conflict with provisions of the trust deeds. (Stangl's 1991 Brief, at 31-36.) The Fund
responded to this argument in its brief (Fund's 1991 Brief, at 19-28). Having now
obtained new counsel, Stangl has continued his search for an ambiguity, arguing now
that the documents were ambiguous because Stangl did not intend to be liable on the
transaction and because the Fund treated the transaction as an "equity."
13

Plateau Min. Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah
1990); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz. 28 Utah 2d 261, 267, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah
1972).
-11-

the meaning and intent of the parties should be enforced. In such a situation, the
parties by their actions have created the ambiguity to bring the rule into operation." 28
Utah 2d at 268, 501 P.2d at 271 (emphasis added). This rule applies only where the
parties by their post-closing conduct demonstrate an intent different from the
documentation.
The parol evidence rule excludes evidence that would vary or contradict the
terms of an unambiguous written contract. Plateau Min. Co. v. Utah Div. of State
Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990) ("Parol evidence is generally not
admissible to explain the intent of a contract which is clear on its face").14 Under the
parol evidence rule, evidence of prior or contemporaneous negotiations,
communications, and understandings are inadmissible.
The parol evidence rule and the doctrine of practical construction are
mutually exclusive: the former excludes pre-execution and contemporaneous extrinsic
14

See also Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983) ("Where a
contract is clear on its face, extraneous or parol evidence is generally not admissible to
explain the intent of the contract."); Rice, Melbv Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County,
646 P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1982) (M[P]arol evidence cannot be used to vary the terms of
an agreement clear on its face," and cannot "be admitted to show that defendant
'promised' to do anything other than as is stated on the face of the agreement."); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp. 655 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1982) ("The terms of
the guarantee are clear and unambiguous, and need no parol evidence to clarify.");
Ephraim Theatre Co. v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 166, 321 P.2d 221, 223 (1958) ("Unless
there is clear ambiguity or uncertainty in the language . . . there is no justification for
interpretation or explanation from extraneous sources. It would defeat the very purpose
of formal contracts to permit a party to invoke the use of words or conduct inconsistent
with its terms to prove that the parties did not mean what they said, or to use such
inconsistent words or conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or ambiguity where none
would otherwise exist."); Richlands Irr. Co. v. Westview Irr. Co.. 96 Utah 403, 418, 80
P.2d 458, 464 (1938) ("[W]hen a writing is clear and plain on its face, and not
ambiguous or doubtful, there is no room for construction but resort must be had to the
language employed in determining meaning or intention").
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evidence; the latter relates only to the post-execution conduct and actions of the parties.
Even if a court were to apply the doctrine of practical construction, the parol evidence
rule would still exclude extrinsic evidence of contemporaneous conversations,
representations, or statements of what the parties intended, thought, believed or
understood concerning the interpretation or the purpose of the writings. Courts
applying the doctrine of practical construction may only consider the parties' postexecution actions and performance.
The decision in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266
(Utah 1972), explains this distinction. In that case the trial court first determined
whether a lease was integrated by considering extrinsic evidence of the "entire
transaction, including the purpose to be served." 28 Utah 2d at 267, 501 P.2d at 270.
Based on that evidence the trial court held, and the Utah Supreme Court agreed, that
the lease was not integrated. Having concluded that the lease was not integrated, the
Bullfrog Court applied the doctrine of practical construction and considered the parties'
post-execution performance in order to resolve the ambiguity in the contract. The
defendant had calculated an incentive commission in a manner different from the
formula contained in a written contract. The plaintiff for some time accepted the
defendant's calculation without protest before the dispute arose. Based on the
defendant's post-execution performance, the Bullfrog court enforced the defendant's
calculation. 28 Utah 2d at 268, 501 P.2d at 271.
Each of the decisions cited by Stangl apply the Bullfrog rule by interpreting
and enforcing written agreements according to the parties' post-execution actions and
performance. Not one of these decisions considered pre-execution or contemporaneous
-13-

extrinsic evidence of what the parties intended or understood. See Eie v. St. Benedicts
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981) (court interpreted and enforced contract
according to post-execution performance of defendant who paid 90% of billings, which
plaintiff accepted rather than flat fee of $90 as stated in written agreement); Bullough
v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965) (court considered parties' post-execution
performance of twenty years to interpret written agreements); Town of Estes Park v.
Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist.. 677 P.2d 320 (Colo. 1984) (court held that
town was not entitled to return water flow under written contract because it had never
asserted a right to such flows subsequent to executing the contract).
At the trial, Stangl proffered testimony only of his understanding and intent
at the time of the closing of the transaction. The lower court properly excluded that
testimony under the parol evidence rule. Stangl argues on appeal:
In this case, although the loan documents appear to be
unambiguous, the parties consistently treated the transaction as an
equity investment. During the trial, Mr. Stangl proffered testimony
that the parties' intent was that the Fund would invest the
$4,350,000 in the shopping center as an equity. The only purpose
for structuring the agreement as a loan was to provide certain tax
benefits to Mr. Stangl. Mr. Stangl testified by proffer, his
understanding of the partnership/loan transaction with the Fund.
(Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 12; emphasis added.)
Stangl's lawyer asked him a number of questions about his "understanding"
about the transaction. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 74, lines 1, 7; 75, lines 24-25; 77, lines 1-3.)
Stangl testified that he did not intend to be personally responsible for the debt in spite
of the language of the documents. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 76, lines 24-25; 77, lines 1-3.) "It
never entered my mind in any way," he testified, that he would be responsible for
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payment of the debt if there were a default. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 77, lines 18-19.)
According to his proffer, he signed the promissory notes (and presumably the
guarantees) to "be at risk" so that he could obtain tax benefits from the transaction.15
(Tr. [1-30-91], at 76, lines 11-19.)
By arguing that the transaction was structured as a loan solely for the
purpose of allowing him to claim tax benefits without actually placing him at any risk
on the notes and guarantees, Stangl seems to concede that the whole transaction was a
sham and a fraud against the government. This Court should not ignore the plain
language of the loan documents to enforce Stangl's fraudulent intent by allowing him to
claim both tax benefits and to avoid paying the loan according to the documents.16

15

According to Stangl's testimony, the tax advantage "was a significant part of the
bargain, that I was to receive a hundred percent of those tax benefits." (Tr. [1-30-91],
at 76.) In his earlier brief, however, Stangl argued that, by giving Stangl only a 20
percent interest in partnership assets with rights to only 20 percent of the net cash
receipts, while requiring him to assume 100 percent of the losses, the Limited
Partnership Agreement created an "obvious disproportionate allocation of interest and
risk." (Stangl's 1991 Brief, at 33.) In his most recent brief, through his new counsel,
Stangl now argues that the tax benefits had no value to the Fund, but that they were of
"significant" value to him. (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 14.) Stangl seems unable to make
up his mind about the real purpose of the transaction and whether the apportionment
of loss was a positive or negative aspect of the transaction.
16

Stangl's two briefs demonstrate his uncertainty regarding the purpose of the
transaction. In his first brief, Stangl argued that the notes and security instrument were
used by the parties, not to give Stangl tax benefits, but to enable the Fund "to acquire
an ownership interest in an income-producing property." (Stangl's 1991 Brief, at 33.)
At the trial and in his second brief, however, Stangl saw the notes as nothing more than
a sham, a fraudulent device through which he would obtain additional tax benefits.
Stangl's confusion over the purpose of the transaction demonstrates the soundness of
the policies underlying the parol evidence rule. By enforcing the rule, the lower court
avoided the kind of speculative and self-serving testimony Stangl sought to introduce.
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Stangl's evidence clearly violated the parol evidence rule, and the lower court
properly excluded it. Stangl proffered no evidence that he acted or performed, after the
closing, in a manner demonstrating that the loans were actually an equity investment
by the Fund.17 The doctrine of practical construction does not apply to his testimony.
The trial court was correct in excluding Stangl's testimony and ruling solely upon the
unambiguous language of the loan documents.
B.

The lower court properly excluded the testimony of Burten Johnson
or, if not, the exclusion was harmless error since his testimony is
not inconsistent with the terms of the documents.
1.

Stangl cannot raise the practical construction doctrine for
the first time on appeal.

Stangl argues that the Fund's treatment on its books of the partnership
transaction with Priceview as an "equity" is evidence of post-closing conduct that is an
exception to the parol evidence rule. (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 7-12.) Stangl did not
make this argument at trial and cannot do so for the first time on appeal. Mascaro v.
Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Shine Dev. v. Frontier Invs.. 799 P.2d 221 (Utah
App. 1990).
2.

The only objection to Johnson's testimony was properly
sustained under the parol evidence rule, since it related to
pre-closing negotiations.

Stangl introduced the testimony of Burten Johnson, who had closed the
Priceview transaction when he was employed by the Fund. During Johnson's
examination on direct, Stangl's counsel asked Johnson to testify regarding a

17

The contrary is true. As shown below, Stangl treated the Notes as valid by
making payments to the Fund for nearly five years.
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conversation that he, Johnson, had had with a mortgage banker named Fred Fairclough,
who had first "brought" the proposal to the Fund. Stangl's lawyer asked the witness,
"Did Mr. Fairclough initially present the package as a loan request or as a salesproposed sale of the property?" (Tr. [1-30-91], at 194.) The Fund objected based on
relevance, materiality, and the parol evidence rule, which the court sustained. Id.
Thereafter, Stangl proffered Johnson's testimony (taking ten pages of trial transcript),
including his testimony that the Fund booked the transaction as an "equity" after it was
closed. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 194-204.)
After the objection was sustained, Stangl made no further attempt to
introduce Johnson's testimony, but merely proffered it all. The court had no
opportunity to determine whether the questions relating to the Fund's post-closing
conduct was admissible and counsel for the Fund had no opportunity to object. The
only question to which the Fund objected related to Johnson's pre-closing conversation
with Fred Fairclough. The objection was properly sustained since the conversation
occurred prior to the closing and clearly violated the parol evidence rule. Yet Stangl's
counsel continued to ask Johnson other questions, including questions relating to the
Fund's post-closing treatment of the transaction, as part of the proffer.18 The record
contains no objection to Johnson's evidence regarding post-closing conduct nor does it
contain any ruling by which the court refused to admit Johnson's testimony. Stangl

18

The record is clear that all of the questions put to Johnson were part of the
proffer. The Fund's counsel clarified that Johnson's testimony was only being proffered
and that the Fund had not been expected to object to any part of it. (Tr. [1-30-91], at
204.)
-17-

cannot claim that the lower court erred in excluding testimony of post-closing conduct
when the only objection that was sustained related to pre-closing negotiations.
If Stangl believed that Johnson's testimony regarding the post-closing conduct
of the Fund in booking the transaction as an "equity" (as opposed to the pre-closing
negotiations with Fairclough) were probative under the practical construction doctrine,
he should have stopped making his proffer and should have sought to introduce the
evidence of the Fund's post-closing conduct. As it was, the Fund had no chance to
object to Johnson's testimony regarding post-closing conduct or even to agree that it
was probative. Had the trial court been given the opportunity to consider Stangl's
argument that Johnson's testimony was relevant under the practical construction
doctrine, the court may well have allowed the testimony to be admitted. In addition,
the Fund would have had the opportunity to cross-examine Johnson on the question
and to call its own witnesses to explain to the trial court what it means to book a
partnership transaction as an "equity." As it was, Stangl merely proffered Johnson's
testimony without explaining to the court that it was admissible as evidence of postclosing conduct. He never asked the court to consider the matter and the court made
no ruling excluding Johnson's testimony.
Stangl now argues, for the first time, that Johnson's testimony was relevant to
show that "the Fund treated this transaction as an equity investment and even carried
this transaction on its books as an equity." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 15.) As argued
above, Stangl cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal. Had he done more
than merely proffer Johnson's testimony following the courfs sustaining of an objection
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to an entirely different question, the matter could have been properly addressed below.
As it is, neither the Fund nor the court had the chance to consider the question.
3.

Johnson's testimony that the Fund booked the transaction
as an "equity" is consistent with the documents and does
not create an ambiguity. At worst its exclusion was
harmless error.

Even considered on the merits, Johnson's testimony was properly excluded or,
if it should not have been, it was harmless error under Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. In his brief, Stangl fails to explain why Johnson's testimony might have
required a different result even if it had been admitted.
Although Stangl insists that the Fund's involvement in the Creekview
Shopping Center constituted an "equity investment," he does not explain why that fact
renders the Notes and Guarantees unenforceable on their terms. The Fund was an
owner of the limited partnership and could properly treat the transaction as an equity
transaction on its books. According to Section 4.01 of the Limited Partnership
Agreement, the Fund, as limited partner, had an 80 percent interest in the partnership.
Burten Johnson testified in his proffer that it was that 80 percent that constituted the
"equity" in which the Fund had some ownership.
According to Johnson's proffered testimony at trial, the Fund had a preexisting panicipating loan with Stangl for the development of the Creekview Shopping
Center, which was restructured in 1983 when the panicipating mongage was convened
to a limited partnership. (Tr. [1-30-911, at 200.) The conversion resulted in an
increase in the Fund's interest from 75 to 80 percent. Stangl proffered the following
testimony from Johnson:
-19-

Q (By Mr. Hunt) Mr. Johnson, just one other area: When
the-when the second-when the transaction was restructured in '83,
was the interest of the-the equity interest of The Fund increased or
decreased or do you recall?
A

It was increased from 75 percent to 80 percent.

Q

Why it went from 75 to 80.

A So as part of that, when I went to the Board with the
proposed restructure, one of the Board embers felt like we should
get more. So basically I went back and negotiated for another five
percent equity position in the deal.
(Tr. [1-30-91], at 203-04; emphasis added.)
When Johnson testified that the Fund treated the Creekview Shopping Center
"as an equity1' on its books (Tr. [1-30-91], at 200), he was referring to the Fund's 80
percent ownership in the limited partnership. The Fund does not dispute that it owned
80 percent of the partnership, as provided in Section 4.01 of the Limited Partnership
Agreement. The fact that the Fund owned 80 percent of the partnership does not
render the Limited Partnership Agreement ambiguous nor does it invalidate the Notes
and Guarantees.
The Fund's ownership interest in the partnership is not inconsistent the
partnership's obligations to repay the loan. Whether or not the Fund considered its
interest as an "equity," the parties clearly and unambiguously provided that the loan
would be made by the Fund and repaid according to the terms of the Notes and
Guaranty Agreements. The parties specifically agreed that nothing in the Limited
Partnership Agreement "shall relieve or be deemed to relieve the Partnership or the
General Partner from any liability for repayment of the loan made or to be made by the
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Limited Partner under Section 4.03 hereof."19 Stangl does not explain why he believes
the loan should not be repaid as a result of the Fund's execution of the Limited
Partnership Agreement.
In the heading of Subpoint I/A of his brief, Stangl argues: "The parties'
conduct created an ambiguity because they both treated the transaction as an equity
investment." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 8.) Stangl contends that "the parties consistently
treated the transaction as an equity investment" (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 12), yet he fails
to describe the legal significance of that fact. One searches his brief in vain for any
analysis of this issue. He concludes that subpoint with the assertion that, "[b]ecause
the parties' actions have demonstrated an intent different from that expressed in the
written agreements, their actions have created an ambiguity." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at
18.) Yet he fails to describe how their post-closing actions showed a different intent
than that expressed in the documents. Stangl does not describe how the Fund's conduct
after the closing created an ambiguity. He does not even state what the ambiguity is.
Most importantly, he fails to state how, exactly, the Fund's ownership of 80 percent of
the partnership affects the validity of the Notes and Guarantees. As noted above, the
19

In Section 4.03 of the Limited Partnership Agreement the parties agreed that the
Fund would make a loan to Priceview in the amount of $4,350,000.00 "in accordance
with the terms, conditions, and provisions set forth in the Promissory Note and
Subsequent Disbursement Agreement" attached to the agreement. Each of the Notes
signed by Priceview obligates the partnership to pay the Fund in "lawful money of the
United States of America." The Limited Partnership Agreement contains other
references to the repayment of the loan. The agreement requires recognized Priceview
to repay the loan in the event of its dissolution. (Limited Partnership Agreement, §
10.02(a).) The agreement contemplates the repayment of the loan in defining the term
"net cash receipts" as being net of certain sums, including "[a] 11 principal and interest
payments actually paid to the Limited Partner in repayment of the loan referred to in
Section 4.03 hereof." (Limited Partnership Agreement, § 7.01.)
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Limited Partnership Agreement provides that its execution would not relieve the
partnership or the general partner from any liability for repayment of the loan.
(Limited Partnership Agreement, § 4.07.)
The testimony of Johnson and Chipman that the Fund booked the transaction
as an "equity" is entirely consistent with the Limited Partnership Agreement. It is also
consistent with partnership's obligations, guaranteed by Stangl, to repay the
$4,350,000.00 that the Fund loaned to the partnership. StangPs brief leaves many
questions unanswered: What conduct of the Fund after the closing is inconsistent with
the documents? Where is the ambiguity? What is the relevance of the Fund's 80
percent ownership in the partnership? Why does Stangl believe that the Notes and
Guarantees are unenforceable? Does Stangl believe that the Notes do not need to be
repaid simply because the Fund owned 80 percent of the partnership? On these issues,
Stangl's brief is silent.
Stangl seeks a reversal of the judgment because the lower court excluded
evidence proffered by Stangl and Johnson. As argued above, Stangl's testimony was
inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. Johnson's testimony, however, was entirely
consistent with the Limited Partnership Agreement. Since that document speaks for
itself as to its legal meaning and effect, Johnson's testimony was unnecessary for the
coun to be able to interpret the document. Where is the error? Had Johnson's proffer
been admitted, the court would have had additional evidence that the Fund owned 80
percent of the limited partnership, exactly as provided in Section 4.01 of the Limited
Partnership Agreement. Johnson's proffered testimony does not create an ambiguity.

-22-

Nor does it show that the Fund placed a practical construction on the transaction that
was inconsistent with the documents.
Stangl fails to address these important issues. Johnson did not testify that he
believed that the Notes and Guarantees signed by defendants were somehow rendered
unenforceable because the Fund treated its ownership of the partnership as an equity.
The lower court found that the Notes and Guarantees were enforceable. This Court
should not disturb that judgment.
C.

The parties acted and performed consistent with the language of the
loan documents.
1.

There was no evidence that the parties by their actions
treated the loan documents as unenforceable after the
closing.

Stangl asserts that the Fund's post-closing conduct in treating the transaction
as an "equity," demonstrates "an intent different from that expressed in the written
agreements." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 18.) As argued above, this issue cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. Even so, the Fund's treatment of its limited partnership
interest as an "equity" was consistent with the loan documents. Moreover, the evidence
at trial of the parties' post-closing conduct clearly reveals their intent: Priceview was a
borrower and the Fund was a lender.
The record of the trial court demonstrates that Stangl acted as a debtor and
the Fund as his lender consistent with the unambiguous language of the loan
documents. From April 1983 to November 1985, Stangl made monthly payments due
under the first Promissory Note and Trust Deed. After failing to pay the monthly
payments from December 1985 through June 1986, Stangl resumed making payments
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again from July 1986 through July 1988. (Chipman Affidavit, Exhibits "N" and "O," R.
843-55.) Stangl fails to explain why, if the loan documents were unenforceable, he
caused Priceview to make payments under the Notes for a period of five years.
The post-execution correspondence between the Fund and Stangl is also
consistent with the loan documents and creates no ambiguity. For example, in a letter
to the Fund from Robert Elliott, StangPs property manager, dated October 7, 1986,
Elliott sought the Fund's approval for termination of a lease. He stated:
In several instances in sections of the Trust Deed Note and the Loan
Agreement document encumbering the Creekview Center, we, as the
borrower, have pledged to Utah State Retirement Fund all the
Leases (among other things) in the center as collaterral [sic] against
the loan.
My concern is that altering or terminating any Lease
Agreement which is considered collateral against the loan without
your approval could be construed as a default of the terms of the
Loan Agreement. If this is not your interpretation of the Trust Deed
Note and the Loan Agreement document and if you are of the
opinion that we are free to alter and/or terminate a Creekview
Center Lease Agreement in an appropriate circumstance, please
advise.
(Exhibit P-48. Tr [1-30-92], at 147-48.)
In his letter, Stangl's property manager recognizes the validity of the note, the
trust deed, and the loan agreement. He refers to Stangl as "the borrower" and seems to
appreciate the risks of violating the loan documents. He does not claim that the
documents were unenforceable or that the Fund only had some sort of "equity" interest
in the project. Elliott was anxious to avoid a default under the documents and so
sought the Fund's approval of a lease termination. The Fund gave its consent to the
termination under paragraph 13 of the Trust Deeds. (Exhibit P-12; see also Tr. [1-30-24-

91], at 151.) Other correspondence between the parties shows that there was no
confusion over the Fund's role as a lender and StangPs as a borrower.20
Not only did Stangl make the monthly loan payments for five years, but
during that period, he referred to the Fund as "his lender."21 Burten Johnson, a
witness called by Stangl, acknowledged that the Fund loaned money to the partnership.
He testified that the Fund's original participating mortgage was converted to "a
partnership with just a loan against the partnership." (Tr. [1-30-91], at 200.) When
Stangl defaulted in 1988, the Fund demanded payment, filed this action, and foreclosed
on the property.
Stangl contends that "until the time the partnership began to lose money,
both parties treated the transaction as an equity investment." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at
22.) This contention is entirely unsupported by the citation to Stangl's testimony at

20

See, e.g., Exhibit P-15 (letter to tenant from Stangl in which he refers to the Fund
as his "partner and Lender"); Exhibit P-23 (letter to Stangl from the Fund, stating that
the Fund, as "lender," would expect to receive the full balance owing in the event that
the property were sold); Exhibit D-16 (letter to Stangl's property manager from Fund
stating that the Fund "placed a participating mortgage" on the shopping center property
and referring to provisions of Limited Partnership Agreement); Exhibit P-33 (letter from
Stangl's attorney to potential buyer, stating that "Mr. and Mrs. Stangl as owners of the
[shopping center] property shall deal with it as they deem appropriate and in their best
interests"); Exhibit P-34 (letter to Stangl from the Fund requesting payment of
delinquent payments due under note); Exhibit P-38 (letter to Stangl from the Fund
identifying itself as "lender on the Creekview Shopping Center," demanding payment of
delinquent payments); Exhibit P-42 (letter to Stangl from the Fund demanding payment
of delinquencies due under Notes and threatening enforcement of the Notes and
Guarantees); Exhibit P-46 (letter to Stangl from the Fund containing final demand for
payment under Notes).
21

Stangl himself also referred to the Fund as "the lender" in his proffered testimony
at trial, which he quotes in his brief. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 77, line 14, quoted in Stangl's
1992 Brief, at 15.)
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trial. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 88.)22 Stangl did not testify that the partnership began to lose
money nor did he assert that the Fund considered the transaction an "equity" until
September of 1986. Rather, he testified that he believed that it was more difficult to
obtain the Fund's consent on his requests for modification or termination of leases at
the Creekview Shopping Center. There was no evidence at trial that the Fund
considered the transaction to be solely an "equity investment."23 There was no
evidence that the Fund treated the loan documents as unenforceable after their
execution.
2.

Stangl did not rely on the Fund's internal
accounting.

Evidence of that the Fund treated the partnership transaction as an "equity"
on its books is irrelevant and immaterial in relation to the enforceability of the loan
documents. There was no evidence, however, that Stangl relied in or acquiesced in the
Fund's treatment of the transaction as an "equity." In Hodges Irr. Co. v. Swan Creek
Canal Co., I l l Utah 405, 181 P.2d 217 (1947), the Utah Supreme Court considered
22

The part of the transcript to which Stangl cited involved an entirely different
issue. Stangl testified that, after he received the Fund's letter dated September 29,
1986, (Exhibit D-16), he believed the Fund had "flipped a switch" by making it more
difficult to get answers regarding proposed lease modifications. Exhibit D-16 was
written in response to Stangl's request to terminate a lease. (Exhibit P-13; Tr. [1-3091], at 146.) In response to Exhibit D-16, Stangl's property manager, Robert Elliott,
wrote the Fund again requesting approval of the termination. (Exhibit P-48.) The
Fund responded by giving its approval under the Trust Deed. (Exhibit P-12; Tr. [1-3091], at 146-55.) This evidence contained no reference to the Fund's suddenly treating
the transaction as a loan. The Fund never though of itself as anything other than a
limited partner and a lender.
23

As noted above, Burten Johnson acknowledged that, although the Fund owned 80
percent of the limited partnership, the partnership had borrowed the loan from the
Fund. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 200.)
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when evidence of a practical construction by the parties would justify a finding that a
contract is ambiguous:
'To warrant the court in according great weight to, or adopting, a
practical construction by the parties, it is necessary and sufficient
that each party shall have placed the same construction on the
contract. While the construction placed by one party on his own
language in a contract is the highest evidence of his own intention,
the meaning of the contract cannot be established by the
construction placed on it by one of the parties, unless such
interpretation has been made to and relied on by the other party, or
has been known to or acquiesced in by the other party.'
I l l Utah at 412, 181 P.2d at 220-21 (quoting 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 325(b), at 764)
(emphasis added).
There was no evidence at trial that the Fund represented to Stangl that the
loans were an "equity" or that Stangl relied on or acquiesced in such a representation.
There was also no evidence that Stangl even knew how the Fund treated the
transaction on its books or that he understood what it meant to treat a transaction as
an "equity." Stangl did not testify that he acted in a manner that indicated the loans
were an "equity." Rather, as noted above, the record demonstrates that for five years
Stangl made the monthly loan payments to the Fund as his "lender." In the words of
Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965), cited by Stangl, his own
'"actions speak louder than words.'" 400 P.2d at 23 (citation omitted).24
24

Stangl also cited the testimony of Mr. William Chipman in which Mr. Chipman
became confused during a line of questioning relating to capital contributions. (Stangl's
1992 Brief, at 22-23.) The witness's misunderstanding was apparent from his testimony
that there was no written agreement by which the Fund agreed to make additional
capital contributions to the partnership under Section 4.04 of the Limited Partnership
Agreement. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 232-33.) Stangl fails to explain how Chipman's
misunderstanding a question creates an ambiguity in the loan documents. Moreover,
(continued...)
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D.

The Court properly excluded the testimony of William Chipman.
Stangl complains that the lower court committed plain error by excluding

William Chipman's testimony when he was asked whether the Fund treated the property
as an "equity." The court sustained the objection based on relevance, materiality, and
the parol evidence rule. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 236-37.)25 As with Burten Johnson's
testimony, Stangl did not argue at trial that the evidence was admissible under the rule
of practical construction. He cannot now raise that issue on appeal for the first time.
Had he done so, the trial court could have corrected any error by admitting the
testimony and the Fund could have clarified the question by introducing additional
evidence regarding the Fund's manner of treating the transaction on its books.
Even if Chipman had been allowed to testify that the Fund booked the
transaction as an "equity," that evidence would have been consistent with the Limited
Partnership Agreement and would not have justified a ruling that the Notes and
Guarantees were unenforceable. The court did not err in excluding Chipman's
testimony. The documents contain a clear and unambiguous statement of the
obligations between the parties, including the payment obligations under the Notes and
Guarantees. The fact that the Fund may have treated the partnership on its internal

24

(...continued)
Stangl's attempt to create an ambiguity by this confused testimony fails under the rule
of practical construction in Hodges Irr. Co. Also, the record clearly reflects that the trial
court, as the finder of fact, was not confused over Chipman's testimony. (Tr. [1-30-91],
at 232, lines 9-11.)
25

In sustaining the objection, the court stated that the Fund's "category of treatment
as far as their internal operation is concerned does not change the legal obligations on
the parties as reflected by the documents they executed." Id.
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books as an "equity" hardly justifies a finding that the Notes and Guarantees are
unenforceable. Even if the court erred in excluding the evidence, that error was
harmless.
E.

William Chipman's deposition is not part of the record on appeal.
Stangl also refers to the deposition testimony of William Chipman. (Stangl's

1992 Brief, at 17-18.) The Court should not consider the deposition of William
Chipman on this appeal because Stangl did not make it available to the lower court.
Depositions not available to the trial judge cannot be added to the record on appeal.
See Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1989); Conder v.
A.I,. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 635-36 (Utah App. 1987). As such, this
Court should not consider Chipman's deposition.
Even if the Court considers Chipman's deposition testimony, however, it is
clear that Chipman is not referring to the specific transaction at issue in this case.
Stangl quotes the following passage from Chipman's deposition:
Q You heard Mr. Johnson testily that he considered these
participating mortgages to be equities because the Fund had great
than 50 percent position. Did you share that conclusion?
A

Yes, I think I shared that with - with him.

(Chipman depo., at 24, quoted in Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 18; emphasis added.)
When Chipman referred to "these participating mortgages" he did not mean
the Limited Pannership Agreement or to the 1983 and 1985 loans to Priceview. Even
so, the fact that the Fund may have booked a participating mortgage as an "equity1
because the Fund was entitled to participate in more than 50 percent of the cashflow
does not render a promissory note and guarantee unenforceable. Under the facts of the
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present case, the Fund's treatment of its interest in the Priceview limited partnership an
"equity1' would similarly have no effect on the obligations set forth in the loan
documents. The lower court correctly excluded Chipman's testimony. Even if the
exclusion were erroneous, however, it was a harmless error that would not have
affected the outcome of the trial. The fact that the Fund may have treated the
transaction as an "equity" would create no ambiguity in the Notes and Guarantees.
II.
THE LOAN DOCUMENTS DO NOT CONTAIN A LATENT AMBIGUITY.
A.

Stangl did not raise this issue below and cannot now raise it for the
first time on appeal.
Stangl argues, for the first time, that a "latent ambiguity exists in the

combination of the partnership agreement and the loan documents." (Stangl's 1992
Brief, at 21.) He did not raise this issue before the trial court, however, and cannot do
so for the first time on appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Shine
Dev. v. Frontier Invs., 799 P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990).
B.

The loan documents do not contain a latent ambiguity.
Even if this Court considers the merits of Stangl's contention, the lower court

judgment must be affirmed. Stangl argues that the Limited Partnership Agreement and
the loan documents are latently ambiguous because, read together, they would "produce
an absurd result." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 21.) Stangl's "absurdity" argument seems to
run like this: Stangl contributed property to the partnership valued at $500,000.00, for
which he received a 20 percent ownership of the partnership. The Fund contributed its
willingness to make a loan to the partnership in the amount of $4,350,000.00. Its
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contribution was valued at $100.00. The Fund received an 80 percent ownership of the
partnership. This "simply did not make sense" asserts Stangl. (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at
21.) In spite of Stangl's current displeasure with the transaction, this Court should not
reverse the judgment based on such a scanty and ill-informed analysis.
In arguing that the structure of the relationship between the Fund and
Stangl26 did not make sense, Stangl overlooks other fundamental features of the
Limited Partnership Agreement. For example, Stangl received 100 percent of the losses,
which gave him substantial tax benefits. (Limited Partnership Agreement § 6.04.)27
Stangl was entitled to manage the project (id. § 5.01) for which he was to be paid a
management fee equal to 4 percent of the total rents collected (id- § 5.03). In addition,
Stangl was entitled to 20 percent of the "net cash receipts" generated from the project.
(Id. § 7.02.) On Priceview's dissolution, Stangl would receive a distribution of his
capital contribution of $500,000.00 after payment of other creditors (including the
Fund's loan) and after the Fund had been paid its $100.00 contribution. (Id. §
10.02(d).) Seen in this light, the Limited Partnership Agreement does not seem all that
absurd. It was hardly a one-sided transaction in which Stangl received no benefit
whatsoever. If Stangl wanted the risks and benefits apportioned differently, he should
have bargained for it during the negotiations so that it would be properly reflected in
26

As noted above, the term "Stangl" includes Price K.M., of which Stangl was
general partner and which, in turn, was general partner of Priceview.
27

As noted above, Stangl proffered his testimony at trial that "there were special tax
benefits that the Retirement Fund was a non-taxable entity, and they had no desire or
ability to get the tax benefits that flowed from the shopping center. It was a significant
pan of the bargain, that I was to receive a hundred percent of those tax benefits." (Tr.
[1-30-91], at 76; emphasis added.)
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the documentation. This Court should not rewrite the agreement simply because Stangl
now regrets the language of the documents. See Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 804
P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1991) (courts will not "rewrite contracts entered into by
parties dealing at arms' length, to relieve one party from a bargain later regretted,
simply on supposed equitable principles.")28
StangPs present belief in the absurdity of the transaction is hardly a basis for
setting all of the documents aside and releasing him from his obligations. It would be
even more absurd to invalidate the loan documents and to release him from the
obligation to repay the substantial sums loaned by the Fund. The Fund has been
unable to locate a Utah case in which the Court invalidated a contract simply because
one of the parties came to believe it was absurd, especially after years of performing
under the contract. Excusing a party from his contractual obligations on that ground
would create havoc and unpredictability in the commercial world. Parties would be left
with little confidence in the enforceability of their contracts. The policy of the law in
this State is to enforce contracts regardless of how senseless they may seem to one of
the panies in hindsight. Any other policy would undermine the expectations of parties
that their contracts will be enforced by the courts.
Further, Stangl attempts to mislead this Court by arguing that the Fund
"assumed no risk with respect to the loan." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 21.) The rule of
law requires enforcement of a contract, regardless of how the parties agreed to
21

See Siler v. Read Inv. Co., 77 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Wis. 1956) ("It must be borne in
mind that the office of judicial construction is not to make a contract conform to the
wishes of a party manifesting itself after the agreement has been made, but to
determine what was agreed and set forth in the instrument itself').
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apportion risk. Moreover, the Fund was not without risk in the transaction. It assumed
the risk that the Limited Partnership would fail and that Stangl would default on the
loans, which would require the Fund to seek its remedies under the loan documents.
The Fund acted as a prudent lender in the transaction, attempting to obtain as much
collateral as possible, including Stangl's personal guaranty. Even so, the Fund's loan of
over $4 million created an enormous risk. Without that loan, Stangl's project could
never have succeeded.
The cases cited by Stangl do not support his argument that the documents
contain a latent ambiguity. Each of the cases involved post-closing conduct, which the
courts considered in determining whether a contract was ambiguous. In Hamada v.
Valley Nat'l Bank. 555 P.2d 1121 (Ariz. App. 1976), the trial court considered activities
of a bank after the bank had received a letter from the defendant purporting to
guarantee a single loan. Because the bank made more than one loan, this made the
meaning of the "single loan" guarantee ambiguous. The court considered the parties'
actions and performance to interpret the letter. The holding of Hamada is no different
from the Utah Supreme Court's practical construction cases discussed above.
Stangl also cites to Rodwav v. Arrow Lieht Truck Parts, Inc., 772 P.2d 1349
(Or. App. 1989) (holding that extrinsic evidence of parties' post-execution conduct was
admissible to define the terms "officers" and "directors" because such terms were
ambiguous), and Pistone v. Superior Court. 279 Cal. Rptr. 173 (Cal. App. 1991)
(remanding because post-execution conduct of parties demonstrated that agency
relationship could have existed contrary to language of document). These cases do not
support Stangl's absurdity argument, but they do support the Fund's argument based on
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the trial record that the parties acted and performed consistent with the unambiguous
language of the loan documents.
The decision in Cashio v. Shoriak, 481 So.2d 1013 (La. 1986) is also a
practical construction case and does not support Stangl's position that an contract that
one party believes is absurd is latently ambiguous. The Cashio court considered
whether a restrictive covenant that provided that "no sign of any kind shall be
displayed" in a residential subdivision was meant to prohibit political signs. The court
concluded that it was absurd to believe that the parties would have intended political
yard signs to be prohibited by the restrictive covenant. Id. at 1016. The court stated:
It is well settled in the jurisprudence that in interpreting
controversial clauses in a contract the court is guided by the
interpretation the parties themselves placed on the agreement and
their understanding of it as shown by their actions. . . . Thus, the
conduct of the parties is relevant in determining their common
intent.
Id. (emphasis added).
This is the doctrine of practical construction. In applying the doctrine, the
Cashio coun determined from the record that political yard signs had been displayed for
six or seven years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. Because the plaintiffs had not
challenged these previous displays, the court held that the parties did not intend to
prohibit the display of political yard signs.
In the present case, there exists nothing in the language of the loan
documents that leads to absurd results. Any interpretation of the loan documents must
be limited by the language of the documents themselves. Even if the doctrine of
practical construction is applied, the evidence shows that Stangl and the Fund acted and
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performed in a manner consislent with the language of the loan documents. Staiigl made payments on the loan tnr ne.tily lnr y< its lirlim1 defaulting.
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accordingly." Id. at 559.29 Applied to the present case, this rule would require Stangl
to comply with the express terms of the loan documents, regardless of whether the
transaction was ultra vires. Because Stangl received benefits from the loan transaction,
he is estopped from raising that defense.
Stangl also cited Weese v. Davis County Common, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992),
for the rule that the ultra vires act of a county is null and void. In Weese, the private
plaintiffs sought to enforce a contract for future merit increases against Davis County.
Weese is factually distinguishable from the present case in which Stangl is attempting to
avoid his obligations owed to the Fund after having received the benefits of the loan
transactions and performed thereon for five years. The Weese Court did not consider
whether a private party who receives benefits from an ultra vires transaction is
estopped from raising illegality as a defense. Weese does not support Stangl's argument
that he is not estopped.30
B.

The Utah Legislature ratified the loan transactions.
The Utah Legislature ratified the loan transactions; by authorizing the Fund to

make any investment in which a prudent person dealing with the property of another
29

Given the court's holding that the town was obligated to perform under the
contract, the statement quoted by Stangl in his brief (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 26) is
nothing more than dicta. Moreover, the court's statement that waiver and estoppel
cannot be raised against the government does not support Stangl's position. 490 P.2d
at 558. The Gila court did not state that a private party who benefits from an ultra
vires government contract is entitled to keep the benefits without performing under the
contract.
30

If the employees in Weese had received merit pay increases but had refused to
perform their obligations, there is little doubt that the court would require them to
perform fully, in spite of their claims that the policy was ultra vires. See Utah State
University v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1982).
-36-

would invest. (Fund's 1991 Brief, at 15-16 & n.13,1 If the loans were ultra ^nVoc
before, this amendment ratifit <
I

.

.y ^e \oanSm

* ? f \'pressly state

stangl reasons thai because the Legislature did

. i vw amendment applied retroaci.. .

cannnt opeiale i r i i u d r m r k in mum iln i mi
4

k

•> ih.ii ilif" rininnlnn4nl had to be

/.Jcr iiic geiieidl ink, it

(Sfanpis 1992 Brief, at 25 n 2 ),

prudem lme'-t^r jmendment, however, applies retroactively wndLr an

oxceprinr r ^ ""he £ener^
* *

.a^uii^n a i\a. . ,i^

<_ . ^herwuod

yo

ASSIK

, Liiv. ^lar. viUiir of Appeals ^xplaimv *kr a statuir ma\ be

lied retroacr,\< :\ ;: n atfrc*- nnb* r-roceudiai dud n ^ «M! .. ...

. .^DIs."

•- — ^ ^ vviucL ne would have
had if the amendment had been enacted before the contract was made," bi it a
substantive change alters the coiiini
Clark 1 I \ Utah 20S, 213, 192 P.2d SRO S03 H948).

. •

The "prudent investor" standaid .-• th. 4t,rer amenunit-n.
S *

under the loan documents. The only right

hk. ,—.biblv . <>.

*: .ve losi ^ his ngiv J c urn that the transaction was ultra vires.

The amend. *-\

iu.il iij'hr .iinl Jili^afiuns nndei the loan

documents. Because the amendment was merely procedural, and the amendment
should operate retroactively to ratify the loans.
C

The Court can give legajxdll^l l! *he loans.
Finally t-stopping Stangl fr >;* raising 1. *-n ' - ^ ,,,. _ ,

J -

-*l

is io consiiw.L ...win as equii) imcbiiw

.; o

jIx,

, ^

ler i1 -t+^cl iu the iuans
*

(Stangk ! ;92 Bnet at J \ )

There ai>-

several avenues available to the Court, however, that would give legal effect to the loan
transactions, including finding that: (1) Stangl is estopped; (2) he lacks standing to
assert ultra vires; (3) the Utah Legislature ratified the loans; (4) the loans were not
ultra vires; or (5) as general partner and guarantor, Stangl is liable under the loans
even though the loans were invalid.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COMPOUND INTEREST.
Stangl did not raise this issue at trial and cannot do so for the first time on
appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Shine Dev. v. Frontier Invs.. 799
P.2d 221 (Utah App. 1990). The lower court ruled on the compound interest issue
when it granted summary judgment against Stangl. Both Stangl and the Fund
addressed the issue in their briefs in the first appeal. (StangFs 1991 Brief, at 45-47;
Fund's 1991 Brief, at 47-49.) Because Stangl did not raise the compound interest issue
at trial, however, that issue was not preserved for this appeal, and there exists no
reason to rehash that issue again.
The Fund refers the Court to the arguments contained in its brief in the first
appeal regarding compound interest. (Fund's 1991 Brief, at 47-49.) In sum, the
language of the Notes allowing interest on "all accrued but unpaid interest" authorizes
compound interest at 18 percent.
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particularly since it was not an issue raised at trial. In any event, the question is moot,
since the real property was sold at a foreclosure sale. The Judgment from which Stangl
appeals in the present case is a deficiency judgment under Section 78-37-2. Even if it
was "procedurally incorrect" for the court to award a judgment against Stangl on his
guarantees at the same time as the court entered a decree of foreclosure, that issue is
not longer meritorious, since the sale has occurred and the property has been sold.
VI.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED
TO RECUSE JUDGE BUNNELL AS THE TRIAL JUDGE.
This issue was fully addressed by the parties in the first appeal and the Fund
refers the Court to its earlier brief. (Fund's 1991 Brief, at 41-47.)
In addition to the arguments raised in his first brief, Stangl now claims that
the lower court "exhibited a bias against Stangl that went beyond ruling in the Fund's
favor." (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 32.) As the sole example of this "bias," Stangl cites the
trial testimony of William Chipman in which the court sustained several objections
made by the Fund. (Stangl's 1992 Brief, at 33-36.) Each of the objections was
properly sustained by the court.31 The court's rulings were correct on the merits and
31

The lower court correctly excluded the testimony of what Mr. Chipman
understood about Section 4.03 of the Limited Partnership Agreement. (Tr. [1-30-91],
at 235.) As explained above, under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic evidence of what
the parties intended or understood regarding an unambiguous integrated contract is
inadmissible. Also, the question whether the Fund made the capital contribution it was
required to make was also inadmissible under the parol evidence rule and was an issue
not previously raised. In spite of the court's sustaining of the objection, Chipman
answered the question in the affirmative. (Tr. [1-30-91], at 236, lines 9-10.) As
argued above, the Judge properly excluded Chipman's testimony regarding whether the
Fund treated the transaction as an "equity." Whether the Fund so booked the
(continued...)
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influence.33 Stangl has not shown any reason not to expect the same of Judge Bunnell
or of any other judge in this State.
CONCLUSION
The loan documents unambiguously required Stangl to make payments to the
Fund, which Stangl did for nearly five years. This Court cannot rewrite the documents
in order to transform the transaction from a loan to a partnership into the purchase of
an "equity." Stangl is liable on his personal Guarantees, in which he waived all
defenses relating to the collateral. Stangl is also estopped from claiming that the loans
were ultra vires. The lower court properly refused to recuse itself, particularly when
there is no other judge in the State who is not also entitled to retirement benefits from
the Fund. The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.

33

See Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 783 P.2d 540 (Utah 1989) (holding that
employee was not entitled to retirement benefits); Utah State Retirement Office v. Salt
Lake County. 780 P.2d 813 (Utah 1989) (holding that property held by the Fund was
exempt from ad valorem property taxes); Franklin v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 779
P.2d 680 (Utah 1989) (rejecting teachers1 equal protection claim); Johnson v. Utah
State Retirement Bd.. 770 P.2d 93 (Utah 1989) (holding that sheriffs and police chiefs
had vested rights that could not be impaired by subsequent statutory amendment); City
of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd.. 767 P.2d 530 (Utah 1988) (holding that
members did not have unilateral right to withdraw from retirement system prior to
passage of statute precluding such withdrawal); Johnson v. Utah State Retirement
Office. 755 P.2d 161 (Utah 1988) (holding that former employees of city hospital could
not recover contributions made by previous employer to their retirement accounts);
Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Board. 652 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1982) (holding that
Board could hire independent outside counsel); Elton v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 28
Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137 (1972) (holding that widow of state court judge was
entitled to widow's retirement benefits); Gottfredson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 808
P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1991) (affirming Board's refusal to allow applicant to withdraw
application for retirement benefits); Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d
671 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that Board was equitably estopped from reducing
employee's benefits).
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